Financialisation of built environments: urban governance, social geographies, and sustainability

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Abstract
This paper is about the ways in which financialisation of built environments has impacted upon the politics, social constitution and sustainability of cities. We focus primarily on financialisation of housing, and do so from the methodological perspective of variegated financialisation: as a generic process that contextually co-evolves with related processes such as neoliberalisation and polarisation, encompassing variegated sets of institutions and social relations. Financialisation is a process whereby privatisation, commodification and securitisation of resources and elements of (built) environments allow for the penetration of financial control and decision-making power into the fabric of societies and environments. Housing is financialised when it is treated above all as a financial asset, i.e. for its exchange value, rather than for its use value. We conclude that financialisation of housing has had severely adverse impacts on democracy, social cohesion and sustainability. Policies for containing financialisation of housing need to include measures to de-commodify housing and urban space more generally, institutionalise floors and ceilings on income and wealth, deepen democracy and use-value-oriented decision-making, and replace market-fundamentalist ideology with egalitarian ideas that recognise our interdependence, how we mutually constitute one another, how we are dependent upon and owe solidarity to others.

Key words: financialisation, built environment, housing, variegated capitalism, comparative urbanism, urban governance, social geographies, sustainability
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1 Introduction

This paper is about the ways in which financialisation of built environments has impacted upon the politics, social constitution and sustainability of cities. We focus primarily on financialisation of housing, and for the sake of delineation exclude related analyses of commercial property, infrastructure and other elements of built environments. We approach this broad field of research from the methodological perspective of comparative urbanism, variegated capitalism, variegated neoliberalisation, and variegated financialisation. This involves understanding financialisation as a generic process, adequately grasped neither from a particularist contextualist standpoint nor through universalist abstractions or typologies. We therefore start with a methodological prologue clarifying the analytical direction to which we aim to contribute.

In section 2 we present our understanding of financialisation drawing on the research literature we find most pertinent to understanding the process in relation to other processes. Financialisation is a process whereby more and more spheres of life (land, water, nature, urban space, art, ourselves) become increasingly treated as financial assets, as carriers of exchange value, thereby warping decision-making about them in ways that diminish or exclude consideration of use values. Section 3 summarizes and presents some of the research that aptly addresses financialisation of housing, especially in European contexts. The following three sections do the same, with special focus on impacts on urban governance, social geographies and sustainability.

1.1 Methodological Prologue: Generic Financialisation of Built Environments

While much of the research literature in urban studies can be understood as aligned with either universalist or particularist perspectives, emphasizing abstractions and empirical contexts respectively, we will draw upon recent work on variegated capitalism and comparative urbanism, especially work in these fields that resonate with Alfred North Whitehead’s relational process philosophy, in order to highlight variegated forms
of financialisation and contribute towards a generic understanding of financialisation of built environments.

Some research into issues surrounding urbanisation reflects a perspective Raymond Williams (1989) called ‘militant particularism’, the idea that local or national struggles hold potential to pave the way for more general struggles. For research this means that endeavouring to grasp the peculiarities of each case is seen as a prerequisite to understanding more general relations and tendencies. In Williams’ view, since struggles are initiated and deepened locally, connecting particular practices to general (global) ones is crucial. Ideals, says Harvey (1995, p. 83), ‘forged out of the affirmative experience of solidarities in one place get generalized and universalized as a working model of a new form of society that will benefit all of humanity’. However, to the extent that the exceptionalist logic of particularist research, popularised for instance in post-colonial theory, diminishes the import of theoretical abstractions while remaining uncritical of the analytical limitations of the particular, it tends to preclude or at least hinder the connecting of particular conditions and processes to more general and unifying perspectives rooted in the Enlightenment (Chibber 2013). ‘The critical problem’ is to ‘transcend particularities’ (Harvey 2000, p. 241), and this is neither easily nor commonly achieved. Williams identified the core problem in ‘assuming an unproblematic extension from its own local and community experience to a much more general movement’, ultimately based in being ‘insufficiently aware of the quite systematic obstacles which stood in the way (1989, p. 115)’

Universalist approaches tend to diminish the significance of local peculiarities by emphasizing abstractions and generalised theory, most notably those based on analyses of advanced capitalist (‘Western’, ‘Global North’) contexts. From the opposite direction (vis-à-vis militant particularism), significant dialectical connections between the particular and the general are undermined by the purpose of ‘applying’ theory to various contexts. A tendency to ignore the substantial challenges each case poses to general theory leads to travelling problems, travelling theory, and in their extension, travelling policy (Peck and Theodore 2015). This tends to preclude testing and revising theory in the face of anomalies, i.e. mismatches between the theoretical map and the terrain of the objective world (Lakatos 1999).
In reviewing research into financialisation of built environments, we seek here to hone an argument for a generic conception of financialisation that can avoid the two opposing traps of over-extending categorical generalisations (universalism), and, exceptionalist exaggeration of contextual epiphenomena (particularism). Generic notions, says Whitehead (1978, p. 17), ‘should make it easier to conceive the infinite variety of specific instances.’ Stengers (2011, p. 19) elaborates: ‘When Whitehead uses the word “generic”, and also when he speaks of “generality”, he is not thinking like a logician and is not giving the term the power to define a class of particular cases … The generic notion does not authorize any definition. It suggests a way of addressing a situation whose eventual success will be the relevance of the questions to which it gives rise. Generalities in the logical sense authorize classifications, with each particular case exemplifying the general characteristic that defines a set of notions. Whiteheadian philosophical generalities, and the notions he calls “generic”, make the wager that the questions to which they will give rise will shed light on features that are important for each situation.’

In close engagement with Whitehead’s relational process philosophy, Harvey (1996, p. 261) argued that ‘some sort of theoretical basis can be forged for all that diverse information’, clarifying that ‘On the one hand, the radically different cartographies have to be respected since they have a real foundation in highly differentiated socio-ecological processes, but on the other it is erroneous to regard them as totally disconnected’ (1996, p. 285). Our case for a generic conceptualisation of financialisation of built environments is founded on this basic insight. The kind of dialectical reasoning such a conception calls for informs formative work in the growing research literature on the themes of variegated capitalism and comparative urbanism (also in FESSUD, e.g. Bayliss et al. 2015).
1.2 Variegated Capitalism

Observing different trajectories in the political economic dynamics of capitalist economies in liberal market contexts and in coordinated market contexts led heterodox economists to challenge the view of capitalism as monolithic and singular, forwarding instead a perspective on varieties of capitalism (Hall and Soskice 2001). Early on, two ideal types were identified: the ideal-typical coordinated market economy and the ideal-typical liberal market economy, each characterised by distinct institutional ecologies (Dixon 2014). A common problem with ideal types is that they tend to ‘become empty formal categories around which sprawling segments of history are assembled’ (Dale 2010, p. 120), the categorizing imperative of the approach tending to reduce analyses to the cataloguing of phenomena. The appeal of ideal types and typologies ‘rests largely on their (spurious) claims to correspond to reality’ (Turner and Factor 1994, p. 156). To this critique, critical realism adds that ‘it is unlikely that much can be learned from comparing them with actual cases, except of course that there will be differences. . . . the arbitrary freezing of contingent patterns, regardless of the structures that produce them, inevitably obscures whatever significance the differences may have, i.e. whether they are unimportant differences in contingent relations or mis-specifications of structural differences. Not surprisingly, the refusal to grant such differences any significance has invited the criticism that ideal type methodology gives users a built-in protection from refutation’ (Sayer 1992, pp. 237-8).

Economic geographers began to critique the varieties of capitalism approach highlighting its methodological nationalism and ideal-typical theorizing, its ‘tendency towards static analysis and latent institutional functionalism’, and its ‘inability to adequately balance national specificity and path-dependency on the one hand with common underlying tendencies in capitalist restructuring on the other’ (Peck and Theodore 2007, p. 731). The variegated capitalism approach critically engages with, while attempting to move beyond, the varieties of capitalism approach. Central to this effort is a resolute focus on the multi-scalar character of capital as process (Peck and Theodore 2007; Brenner, Peck and Theodore 2010; Dixon 2014; Zhang and Peck 2016). While ‘the ontological status of national-economy is accepted as more or less given in varieties scholarship, this is problematized quite explicitly in economic geography, where the spaces and scales that are constructed by circuits of value and
regimes of valuation are no longer assumed to be pregiven’ (Peck and Theodore 2010, p. 759). Jessop (2013) summarised the variegated capitalism approach as pointing ‘to incomplete, provisional, inherently unstable, and fractal economic orders that are based on the co-existence, structural coupling, asymmetrical conditioning, and co-evolution of different, but still dynamically compossible, accumulation regimes and modes of regulation seen in terms of their multiscalar location in time-place and in space of flows.’

Work from the variegated capitalism perspective spawned similar and related research into variegated neoliberalisation (e.g. Brenner, Peck and Theodore 2010; Macartney 2011; Peck 2013) and variegated financialisation (e.g. Doucette and Sao 2011; Lai 2016). With intersecting foci, each involves paying particular attention to the uneven geographies of these processes. Given the global reach of variegated forms of neoliberalisation and financialisation, the study of variegated capitalism today calls for cognizance of relations across the nested hierarchies of global, national, regional and local scales, i.e. the ‘spatially heterogeneous’ and ‘temporally discontinuous’ character (Brenner, Peck and Theodore 2010, p. 188) of neoliberalisation and financialisation in capitalist social formations.

Generally speaking, ‘[n]ew rounds of market-oriented regulatory reform are . . . associated with unpredictable “layering” effects in relation to inherited institutional landscapes, as well as with progressively “thickening” inter-referential logics, parameterization processes and co-evolutionary dynamics within increasingly transnationalized fields of policy transfer’ (Brenner, Peck and Theodore 2010, p. 189). Since in practice, neoliberalisation and financialisation must unavoidably be realised in specific legal, political and institutional contexts within nested geopolitical hierarchies, their particular outcomes will vary significantly across time-space. As Brown et al. (2015, pp. 47-48) argue, the concept of variegated financialisation captures ‘the differences in the process of financialisation as it plays out in nation states, while recognising at the same time that there is a common process of financialisation at a system-wide level.’

1.3 Comparative Urbanism
With particular focus on cities, comparative urbanism aims to develop a general theoretical framework in order to understand the relational dynamics of urban change across local and global scales, sensitive to similarities as well as differences between cities (Nijman 2007). Analysing the political, economic, and social dynamics of post-Fordist, neoliberalising cities, Dear (2007) questions the monolithic view of the modern city and calls for comparative studies that can nuance understanding of urbanisation. For this, he argues, we need ‘a heuristic device capable of describing the principal historical and geographical dimensions of the places and processes under review’ (2007, p. 249). Comparative studies of urbanisation processes around the world seeking such heuristics can provide a basis for developing urban theory sensitive to both variation and generic relations.

Jennifer Robinson and colleagues at UCL have established comparative urbanism as an influential approach to urbanisation that challenges received urban theory by developing a critical perspective on urbanisation, drawing upon the experiences and knowledge of ‘the others’. An emancipatory move towards critical urbanism, they claim, can only be achieved with the benefit of a broader understanding of urban experiences globally, and not just those of Western cities (Robinson 2004; McFarlane and Robinson 2012; Lees 2012). Comparative urbanism provides a platform for such an understanding. It seeks to generate regionally-based theorisations of urbanisation in order to inform wider debates and advance urban theory, not least in the field of gentrification theory, where comparative urbanism has recently proven especially fruitful (Atkinson and Bridge 2005; Clark 2005; Lees, Slater and Wyly 2008; Lees 2012; Lees, Shin and Lopez-Morales 2015; Clark 2015; Shin, Lees and Lopez-Morales 2016; Jou, Clark and Chen 2016; Lees, Shin and Lopez-Morales 2016). Comparative urbanism furthermore offers a strategic alternative to globally uneven neoliberal inter-urban competition by bringing inter-urban partnership into discussion (Clarke 2012).

These two theoretical frameworks, variegated capitalism and comparative urbanism, we see as complementary approaches that together can provide a basis for understanding financialisation of housing as a generic conceptualisation of relational processes dialectically connected with urban politics, social geographies and urban ecologies. In what follows, we first present some basic remarks regarding
characteristics of financialisation, and then briefly review processes of financialisation of housing. Sections four, five and six subsequently provide selective overviews of research into the impacts of financialisation of housing on urban politics and governance, on social geographies of exclusion and inequality, and on urban sustainability.
2 Financialisation

[The political economy of securitization is to a very large extent coequal with the politics of mass financialization. (Aalbers and Engelen 2015, p. 1604)]

More than the mere growth of a sector, financialisation is a process of ‘widening and deepening the reach of financial interests’ (Pike and Pollard 2010, p. 33), penetrating and transforming territories, economic spheres and actors. Financialisation is intertwined with the rise of neoliberalism as globally dominant ideology since the late 1970s, radically changing political, economic, social and geographic landscapes (Deménil and Lévy 2004; Deménil and Lévy 2011; Harvey 2005). The concept of financialisation facilitates ‘interrogation of the contingent ways in which financial practices and processes are reshaping economic and social processes at multiple spatial scales’ (Murphy 2015, p. 208). Its significance stems from advances into aspects of life commonly considered more social, cultural and environmental than economic or financial. As Ben Fine (2014, p. 55) argues, ‘not only has the presence of finance grown disproportionately within the direct processes of capital accumulation for the purposes of production and exchange, it has also increasingly intervened in less traditional areas associated with what might be termed social as opposed to economic reproduction.’ Similarly, Doucette and Sao (2011, p. 148) emphasise how financialisation destabilises and reconstructs ‘older place-bound relations among firms, governments and other stakeholders with new sets of global standards, corporate governance, or sources of capital.’

Things are financialised when they are treated above all as financial assets from which revenues flow merely due to possession. This is why property rights and privatisations are essential to financialisation as an expansive process whereby land (nature, ‘the environment’) and elements of built environments become real estate. The ‘increasing tendency to treat the land as a pure financial asset’ underlies ‘the form and the mechanics of the transition to the purely capitalistic form of property in land’ (Harvey
1982, p. 347). The same can be said today about music, words, ideas, organisms and ourselves, as intellectual property rights, bio-prospecting and branding open up new spheres for financial ‘earnings’ through speculative ‘investment’. Once treated as pure financial asset with expectations on financial yield, these are also reduced to just another ‘special branch of the circulation of interest-bearing capital’ (Harvey 1982, p. 347). Financialisation involves the subordination of use values to exchange values, in sphere after sphere, thereby expanding the volumes of ‘investment opportunities’ for ever more concentrated centres of financial wealth.

Establishment of private property rights in land – in its broadest sense including bodies of water and elements of land commonly called natural resources – creates a foundation for the commodification of environments by judicially and administratively rendering specific parts tradable on markets, where their exchange value can guide decisions on investment. The profit- and rent-seeking behaviour of finance capital and landed-developer interests drive the formation of market relations through the privatisation and commodification of built and natural environments, extending the process wherever property relations retain the characteristics of commons that hinder the free flow of financial ‘investment’. Environments are securitised and, treated as pure financial assets, enter the orbit of finance capital as potential sites for investment, or disinvestment, depending on their expected yield to shareholders. This has been a cornerstone of neoliberal, market-fundamentalist politics (Block and Somers 2014).

Financialisation is a process whereby privatisation, commodification and securitisation of the environment allow for the penetration of financial control and decision-making into the fabric of societies and (built) environments. It has involved ‘the phenomenal expansion of financial assets relative to real activity (by three times over the last 30 years)’ and ‘the absolute and relative expansion of speculative as opposed to or at the expense of real investment’ (Fine 2013, p. 6, emphasis added). Ever in search of new fields to securitise and invest in, the financial sector actively engages in the creation of conditions allowing nature ‘to circulate as financial capital’ (Prudham 2007, p. 259), entailing enclosures of resource commons and the displacement of people, their livelihoods, knowledge and practices.
We emphasise investment because, as Sayer convincingly argues, it is ‘the most dangerously ambiguous word in our economic vocabulary’ (2015, p. 34). Masking the difference between wealth extraction and wealth creation, it camouflages the former as the latter. Sayer distinguishes object-oriented definitions that focus on what is invested in (enabling production of new use values in goods, services and skills) from ‘investor’-oriented definitions that focus on ‘the financial gains of the “investor” from any kind of spending, lending, saving, purchase of financial assets or speculation – regardless of whether they contribute to any objective investment, or anything socially useful’ (Sayer 2015, pp. 34–35). The slippage between these usages is a source of mystification, concealing the subordination of use value to exchange value, while obscuring the moral difference ‘between contributing to the creation of something useful and just getting a return, no matter what’ (Sayer 2015, p. 36). Sayer associates the rise of exchange-value-oriented ‘investment’ relative to use-value-oriented investment to ‘the emergence of “financialised” capitalism, which prioritises making money out of money, instead of the tricky business of organising people to produce goods and services. It’s truly extraordinary that we treat these different things as one and the same without even noticing.’ Such are the confusions generated by financialisation as use values become reduced to exchange values.

Finance capital claims to ‘see the world as full of potential’, indeed, to ‘see potential everywhere’ (HSBC billboards). Financialisation reaches into everyday life as we increasingly consider our homes, our education, and even ourselves, as financial assets we ‘invest’ in for the sake of financial returns (Martin 2002; Michaels 2011). It reaches into education systems, healthcare, infrastructure of various kinds, urban planning as well as political life: wherever exchange-value-driven decision-making displaces use-value-oriented decision-making. Financialisation is dialectically entwined with social polarisation and privatisation, exploiting while intensifying inequalities in economic and political power and driving the privatisation of commons in order to expand the sphere of properties as investment opportunities open to speculation on changes in exchange values.
3 Financialisation of housing

Creating liquidity out of spatial fixity is an uneven, multidirectional and open-ended restructuring process that is frequently associated with crisis-generating breakdown and instability. (Gotham 2009, p. 366)

Like land before it, housing is financialised to the extent it is treated primarily as a financial asset through which interest-bearing and rent-seeking capital flows. The basic need for shelter underlies inclusion of housing in the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Article 25). With financialisation this basic need becomes not only a commodity in newly formed housing markets, but also, through securitisation (turning fixed, illiquid assets into securities through which liquid capital can seek returns on ‘investment’), the very foundation upon which investment instruments and vehicles create expanding spheres of investment opportunities. This process involves not only banking capital but many other financial institutions as well, including hedge funds, venture capital, pension funds and equity funds (Hudson 2012; Theurillat, Corpataux, and Crevoisier 2010; Edwards 2016a).

The liquid assets of finance capital are continuously faced with the geographical fixity of those material assets – in particular built environments – through which they flow. Finance capital therefore requires, deploys and often engineers innovative strategies for capital switching, to manage and reduce risks and to adjust local regulatory strategies to global ones (Savini and Aalbers 2016). There is an inherent instability in the transformation of illiquid immobile assets into liquid commodities amenable to rapid trading on financial markets (Gotham 2009). While a commonly recognised attribute of land is its ‘capacity for protected yields through time’ (Savini and Aalbers 2016, p. 2), this is less so for built environments which display speculative miscalculations and highly uneven development across urban space.
Such a financial transformation occurs through various processes, among others mortgage markets, securitisation, private debt, and collateralised debt obligations (Karacimen 2013). As a process of transforming illiquid assets like housing or land into liquid securities, securitisation plays a key role in the urbanisation process through risk reduction and the formation of investment channels. With the deregulation of finance associated with neoliberalisation, securitisation has become a dominant financial process linking urban development and housing across local, national, and international scales (Gotham 2009).

In the US, where the first wave of the Great Recession originated, participation of private financial actors, including the ‘public’ labelled institutions of Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and Ginnie Mae, is salient (Gotham 2006). Sub-prime mortgages were designed for low income borrowers with low ability to pay-off loans provided with low or no down payments and dubious security. Banks and hedge funds securitised the loans with bonds such as residential mortgage-backed securities worth up to twice the value of the property, through a mechanism called collateralised debt obligation (Dodd 2007). By the time the crisis hit, the public sector still accounted for roughly half of the mortgage-backed issuances. And the rest is history: ‘Millions of homeowners had lost their homes and seen their credit history decimated. Countless renters were evicted with little notice after their landlord went into foreclosure’ (Immergluck 2009, p. 341).

Studying financialisation of urban development in Milano, Savini and Aalbers (2016, p. 3) identify three characteristics of urban transformation in neoliberal urban development, namely: ‘(a) the tendency to relocate investments across the region; (b) the increased capacity to cluster projects and intertwine different investments; (c) the tendency to address planning as instrumental to facilitate the influx of financial investments.’ Similarly, Gotham (2009, p. 357) notes that ‘the development and integration of securities markets, the formation of large pools of private investment capital, and the development of new real estate financing tools — e.g. adjustable rate mortgages (ARMs), mortgage-backed securities (MBS), real estate investment trusts (REITs), among others — suggests a profound institutional transformation in which the real estate sector has come to resemble an economic sector composed of finance markets and instruments rather than a sector defined by producer markets.’
The globalised nature of financial markets poses a political economic tension between the localised characteristics of housing and the scalar expansion of real estate markets. Bridging this tension involves policy making, regulations, and the production of detailed knowledge about housing characteristics, bringing some analysts to emphasise ‘the reach of markets to extract that knowledge, reduce its unpredictability, and routinize and commodify it’ (Gotham 2009, p. 357). Securitisation of mortgages relieves this tension by bundling individual properties into large portfolios. The creation of securities markets came about in part as a response to past economic crises, most notably the stagflation crisis of the early 1970s (Gotham 2009; Vercelli 2014a; Savini and Aalbers 2016).

In a comparative study of European countries, particularly Italy and the Netherlands, Aalbers (2012) positions liberalisation of credit and mortgage markets as part of a broader neoliberal agenda of privatisation and commodification. He identifies three types of globalisation, with counterparts at the regional scale of Europe: globalisation and Europeanisation of firms, of markets, and of regulation. None of these occur in universally uniform ways. While globalisation and Europeanisation of regulation has impacted national regulatory systems, they have not obliterated nationally distinct forms. The European credit and mortgage system is not simply an expanded homogenised compromise of national systems, but has transformed each of them as they dialectically connect across scales (Aalbers 2012).

In Britain, with one of the earliest neoliberalised mortgage markets in Europe, private lenders (some of which were recently demutualised building societies) got increasingly involved in the securitisation and bond markets since the mid-80s (Aalbers 2012; Wainwright 2012). Pressure to increase dividends to shareholders, especially international shareholders, spurred a spatial strategy to shift investments towards locations with more stable prospect for mortgage repayment, not just in terms of land values but also in terms of labour market buoyancy (Wainwright 2009). This contributed to the deepening unevenness of urban development, socially and economically.

Globalisation and Europeanisation of mortgage markets are performed in the context of historically and geographically rooted economies, altering rather than replacing
national systems. Countries develop different mortgage market trajectories. However, these national differences, although significant, tend to slow down convergence rather than jeopardise it (Aalbers 2012). As a telling case one can point to the Netherlands, Portugal and Italy, which in spite of large differences in rates of mortgage debt (high in the Netherlands and Portugal; low in Italy) are becoming more and more similar (Santos, Serra and Teles 2015; Aalbers 2007). In the Netherlands, neoliberalisation of the mortgage market in the last two decades, has led to marked increases in loan-to-value-ratio up to 125 percent of the value of the property, making the Dutch population one of the most indebted in Europe (Aalbers et al. 2011; Engelen et al. 2010). The case of Portugal is particularly interesting as although its adoption of the Euro in 1999 led to a boom in its highly privatised construction and housing sector, a malfunctioning integration into the global financial system stymied sustained development (Santos, Serra and Teles 2015). Another example is the case of post-socialist transitional economies like Poland with relatively moderate mortgage markets fuelled by foreign finance and deposits (Lis 2015; cf. Stenning et al. 2010). Out of this diversity of particular contexts it is possible to perceive dialectically coevolving processes of financialisation of housing with generic qualities that allow for recognition of both differences and underlying similarities.
4 Financialisation of housing and urban governance

[The ideology of governance ... effectively masks the class and social relations that are redistributing wealth and income to the affluent through a networked and decentered system of organized political-economic power. (Harvey 2009, p. 71)]

The penetration of finance capital into urban life is made possible through a series of legal and regulatory transformations associated with a shift from managerial government to entrepreneurial governance. David Harvey captured this shift in the concept of urban entrepreneurialism, part and parcel of variegated neoliberalisation that rolled out the legal and political basis for financialisation of urban space. With urban entrepreneurialism, ‘investment increasingly takes the form of a negotiation between international finance capital and local powers doing the best they can to maximise the attractiveness of the local site as a lure for capitalist development’ (Harvey 1989, p. 5). The centrepiece of this new regime for practicing politics is the now pervasive public-private partnership, through which ‘traditional local boosterism is integrated with the use of local governmental powers to try and attract external sources of funding, new direct investments, or new employment sources’ (Harvey 1989, p. 7). The implications of urban entrepreneurialism include: enhanced ‘geographical flexibility with which multinational firms can approach their locational strategies’ (p. 11); a ‘general increase in problems of impoverishment and disempowerment’ (p. 12); priority to ‘creating the preconditions for profitable investment’ (p. 12); ‘emphasis on tourism, the production and consumption of spectacles’ (p. 13); and encouraging ‘the movement in of capital and of the ‘right’ people’ (p. 14).

Harvey distinguishes between political economies of place and territory, and argues that the main focus of urban entrepreneurialism is on the former. The political economy of territory he says is about ‘kinds of economic projects (housing, education, etc.) that are designed primarily to improve conditions of living or working within a particular
jurisdiction’ (1989, p. 7). The political economy of place is the preferred focus of urban entrepreneurialism because ‘the construction of place (a new civic center, an industrial park) or the enhancement of conditions within a place (intervention, for example, in local labour markets by re-training schemes or downward pressure on local wages) … can have impacts either smaller or greater than the specific territory within which such projects happen to be located’ (Harvey 1989, p. 7). Like everything else under the influence of neoliberalisation and financialisation, places are commodified and sold to the highest bidder, and political success is measured by the metrics of attracting ‘investments’ and the ‘right’ people (the ‘creative class’). Public-private partnerships operate through ‘investment and economic development with the speculative construction of place rather than amelioration of conditions within a particular territory as its immediate (though by no means exclusive) political and economic goal’ (Harvey 1989, p. 8). Such a mechanism requires certain kinds of state intervention into entrepreneurial activity. Entrepreneurial governance forces municipalities to back up the risks of financial investments by the highly financialised private sector with both public finances and easing policies (Savini and Aalbers 2016). Local governments are thus called upon to compete geographically by providing ‘good business climate’.

In some countries like Spain, the central state plays a crucial role in urban planning policies (Coq-Huelva 2013). The Spanish state has promoted home ownership with easing and deregulation of financial and development policy. The rate of home ownership in the country prior to the Great Recession was as high as 87 percent (even higher than the UK and the US) (Lopez and Rodriguez 2011). This was made possible through easing development permits and allocation of land through the Land Regime and Rating Act of 1998. This was coupled with tax relief for home ownership and a large securities market (second in Europe after the UK). This context provided fruitful ground for speculation on land, inducing dramatic increases in housing prices and hence, a credit bubble. And despite a relatively controlled subprime mortgage market, the level of household indebtedness rose to 84 percent of the GDP making the country vulnerable to crisis (Lopez and Rodriguez 2011; Hardiman et al. 2013).

Rachel Weber (2010, p. 252) shows how the penetration of finance capital into housing and urban development involves ‘increase in municipal debt, the privatisation and
securitisation of public assets, the size and scope of the financial services available to city governments, and the investor-orientation of critical collective consumption decisions’. In other words, financialisation provides a ground not only for the private sector to capture greater revenues in profit, rent and interest, but also for local governments to engage in entrepreneurial activities through securitisation and leverage. She insists, however, that ‘a generalized pressure to attract capital does not mean that local governments have been equally financialized across space’ (Weber 2010, p. 252). In some cases, municipalities use their local finances as debt leverage to borrow even more. In others, the municipal finances are used to help municipalities regain their independence from financial markets. In response, financial markets neglected some highly indebted entrepreneurial cities, while forcing other cities to accept ‘high-interest debt on usurious terms’ (Weber 2010, p. 253). Weber’s analysis thereby conceives the new system of public-private partnership as a variegated political economic mechanism, not a homogenous and uniformly mobile policy.

In contrast, Savini and Aalbers (2016) problematize Weber’s (2002; 2010) emphasis on the active role of local governments in financialisation and urban development for their own sake. According to them, favourably situated land plots with high potential rents have given some municipal governments an upper hand in negotiating terms with developers, financial markets and creditors. Local governments are nevertheless to some extent dependent on financial actors and future investments due to ‘conditions of fiscal stress and a concentration of social problems’ (Savini and Aalbers 2016, p. 4), as the case of Spain clearly shows with alliances of local governments and real estate investors in promoting entrepreneurial urban planning (Coq-Huelva 2013). The potential prospects of property development to alleviate some social problems are presented as rationale for extensive engagement of financial interests in urban planning. Strong local regulatory regimes can help local governments to gain stronger positions in negotiation, but financial corporations and private developers still have the upper hand in changing those public regulatory regimes and forcing public indebtedness through lobbying (Coq-Huelva 2013). This can be compared with the UK housing sector where state deregulations have led to chronic undersupply in a basically dysfunctional system (Robertson 2014b; cf. Robertson 2014a).
While research into urban entrepreneurialism has emphasised how city governments support the rent-seeking strategies of landed developer interests, there has been remarkably little research into how financial actors have in practice been able to shape urban development and redevelopment projects. A new study by Guironnet, Attuyer and Halbert (2016) focuses on this question in the context of the Paris city-region. Their findings suggest that the practices of urban politics and urban planning are heavily influenced by financial actors such that urban redevelopment projects are ‘increasingly shaped to provide investment opportunities for financial investors’ (Guironnet, Attuyer and Halbert 2016, p. 1442).

Immobility and illiquidity of land, as mentioned above, pose a barrier to financialisation. The entrepreneurial city meets this challenge by introducing new instruments and methods of urban development. Clustering, relocation, planning instrumentalism, and hand-outs to landed developer interests are among the methods that have been applied to facilitate commodification of urban space and to securitise it for new financial investment vehicles (Savini and Aalbers 2016). As Gotham (2009, p. 357) argues, ‘liquidity is variable, contingent and dependent on state actions and legal and regulatory frameworks to support the standardization, homogenization and exchangeability of commodities.’

The regulatory regimes of local governments may be obstacles to or stimulants for securitisation of urban space, as witnessed in the cases of Poland and Portugal (Lis 2015; Santos, Serra and Teles 2015). In other words, the process of transformation of illiquid assets to liquid ones, and tensions over regulatory regimes, are influenced by local power relations manifested in ‘political struggles and conflicts over policy formulation and implementation’ (Gotham 2009, p. 357). Although the financial sector is the most internationalised sector of capitalist economies, financial regulations in the EU tend more to harmonise rather than globalise financial sectors among EU and EMU members (Aalbers 2012). Rules and regulation standards are harmonised across Europe, but implemented and practiced nationally. This tendency puts geographical and political economic limits on de-territorialisation and the globalisation of the entrepreneurial city (Sassen 2009).
Urban entrepreneurialism opens up spaces of opportunity for profitable investments through commodification, privatisation and marketization of the environment, facilitating processes of accumulation by dispossession (Harvey 2006) by bringing urban governance ‘into line with the naked requirements of capital accumulation’ (Harvey 1989, p. 15). The shift from managerialism to entrepreneurialism manifests the broader variegated process of neoliberalisation, involving the construction of a world in which ‘certain truths stand out as self-evident, chief of which is that everything under the sun must be in principle and wherever technically possible subject to commodification, monetisation and privatisation’ (Harvey 2014, p. 60).
Financialisation builds upon while generating socio-economic inequalities, reflecting the resurgence of a rentier class. At one end, huge volumes of unearned income and wealth are channelled into the hands of a very few. At the other end, evictions and disposessions, homelessness, crowded housing conditions and severe lack of affordable housing cause inestimable human suffering. At the global scale, just 62 individuals possess more wealth than the poorest half of humanity (down from 388 individuals in 2010). Since 2010, the wealth of the richest 62 individuals has risen by 45 percent, while that of the poorest 3.6 billion people fell by 38 percent (Oxfam 2016). Polarisation at the national and European scale is less severe, though evident in increasing Gini-coefficients of income (including income of capital) and wealth.

That the bourgeoning literature on inequality attracts so many readers and analysts is not only because there is so much of it to study but also because it makes such a great difference in so many ways, from a broad array of social and health problems, to trust, democracy and willingness to assume social and environmental responsibility (Wilkinson and Pickett 2009). Inequality is ‘not just about the size of wallets. It is a socio-cultural order, which (for most of us) reduces our capabilities to function as human beings, our health, our self-respect, our sense of self, as well as our resources to act and participate in this world’ (Therborn 2013, p. 1). Financialisation is facilitated by while contributing to this socio-cultural order of inequality. The costs of ‘The Killing Fields of Inequality’ are immense: human suffering, unrealised flourishing, disabled democracy, impaired trust, loss of solidarity and security, and a whole raft of social, psychological and physical health problems.
With extreme concentrations of income and wealth comes the plutocratic power at one end to control media and politics in order to create legal and regulatory conditions for financialisation, exacerbating socio-economic polarisation. At the other end, those weakened by inequalities are more vulnerable to displacement, as rent seeking capital pursues accumulation by dispossession. As Harvey (2014, p. 133) argues, rent seeking 'is nothing more than a polite and rather neutral-sounding way of referring to' accumulation by dispossession. Although financialisation occurs also outside the sphere of housing (such as in the land and built environments of agriculture, industry, infrastructure and public space), with considerable impact on livelihoods and social geographies, housing is a major sphere of financialisation in which the uneven development of social geographies are formed and transformed.

Processes of socio-spatial change that have long been the focus of urban research – segregation, ghettoization, slum formation, filtering, gentrification, socio-economic polarisation – are intensified by the financialisation of housing. Clearly separating financialisation of housing from other processes that contribute to socio-spatial change is not feasible. It is more adequate to see them as coevolving. All these processes of socio-geographic change occur under capitalism even in contexts without 'intensification of the transformation of real property into financial instruments' (Fainstein 2016, p. 1503). Housing policies can for instance ameliorate or aggravate socio-spatial polarisation regardless of financialisation. But financialisation evidently contributes to the pace and intensity of polarisation, at least in its variegated forms in recent years.

But this need not necessarily be the case. As Fainstein (2016, p. 1503) explains, 'the recent intensifying of financialisation per se does not produce uneven development, since uneven development has always been a hallmark of real estate development under capitalism. Rather it is the combination of financialisation with neoliberal ideology, globalisation and the constriction of state-sponsored social welfare and housing affordability programs that underlies the inequities produced by property investment.' She goes on to argue that financialisation and associated financial instruments in the hands of progressive policy makers, ‘by increasing flexibility in approaches to new construction and regeneration, could enable an improved
This project has received funding from the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme for research, technological development and demonstration under grant agreement no 266800

distribution of the benefits of urban development… if they are able to challenge neoliberal hegemony’ (Fainstein 2016, pp. 1503, 1507). This resonates with Fields’ analysis of changes in mortgage finance suggesting that ‘rather than anchoring wealth in place via property, today mortgages facilitate global investment and the extraction of value from place-bound property’ (Fields 2015, p. 148).

Sweden offers perhaps an extreme case of neoliberalisation of the housing sector during the last quarter century, referred to as the ‘system switch’ (Clark and Johnson 2009; Lund Hansen et al 2015). Socio-geographic change associated with this switch reveals a distinct pattern of polarisation, in which gentrification increasingly occurs in high-income areas (so-called super-gentrification), while filtering increasingly occurs in low-income areas (Hedin et al 2012). Relatively rich households have markedly expanded their housing consumption, while the relatively poor have had to adapt to commodification and marketization of housing by reducing housing consumption. This shift in Sweden reflects a wider tendency in the UK and other countries towards ‘an asset-based welfare state underpinned by private homeownership’ (McKee and Muir 2013, p. 2; cf. Walks 2016).

A number of analyses relating socio-spatial changes to financialisation of housing lend support to the claim that financialisation, facilitated by neoliberalisation, has intensified polarisation and socially uneven development. In Berlin, for instance, while ‘credit was easily available and demand for investment high, funds speculated on the potential to rapidly flip the property, neglecting the housing and contributing to the rapid physical and social deterioration of these neighborhoods’ (Fields and Uffer 2016, p. 1495). Segregation in post-revolutionary Portugal intensified due partially to exclusionary practices, excluding low-income segments of population from mortgages (Santos et al 2015). Similarly, in Milano, Italy, the financial practices of redlining and greenlining put their stamp on social geographic change (Aalbers 2007).

In the UK, marketization and financialisation of housing has been boosted by Thatcher’s slashing of public housing and promotion of homeownership. In 2013 total assets of the financial sector reached as high as 11 times the country’s GDP (Edwards 2016b). ‘With prices rising and most real incomes static or falling, many households, especially in the southern half of the UK and in prospering cities, have
been unable to meet their expectations of becoming owner-occupiers; others are unable to access the social housing which had been (relatively) available to earlier generations in the post-war decades’ (Edwards 2016b, p. 227). And with a largely privatised rental sector and deregulations of rents it is increasingly difficult for low income citizens to find affordable housing (Watt and Minton 2016).

There is an extensive research literature on rent gaps as key mechanism underlying social geographic change, most notably in the contexts of gentrification (upward shift in socio-economic status of an area combined with investment in built environment) and filtering (downward shift in socio-economic status of an area combined with disinvestment in built environment) (Smith 1979; Slater 2016). The rent gap denotes the difference between capitalised land rent and potential land rent under the land’s ‘highest and best use’. Filtering is associated with the widening of the rent gap, spurred by disinvestment and financial redlining, while gentrification is associated with the closing (capturing) of the rent gap through reinvestment in new or renovated housing (Clark 1995). Rent gaps are therefore fundamental to understanding how financialisation impacts on socio-spatial change (Clark et al 2015).

Rent gaps have historically driven social geographic change even under conditions where financialisation does not hold sway. What financialisation of housing and built environments does is facilitate the making and taking of rent gaps by turning fixed and immobile assets into securitised liquidities open to the speculative investments and disinvestments of financial institutions. This injects dynamism into the flows of capital into, across and out from built environments. Combined with neoliberalisation of housing policies and the turn to urban entrepreneurialism, financialisation of housing leads to social geographic polarisation, as wealthy areas experience ‘super-gentrification’ and poor areas decline in slum formation (see Hedin et al 2012 for an empirical analysis). The classical pattern of gentrification – displacing low-income residents to make space for ‘regeneration’ and ‘revitalisation’ – is also intensified and re-scaled as financiers seek to maximise potential rents by planning for complementary land uses within large scale redevelopments.

The socio-spatial implications of financialisation of housing assume different forms in different contexts, yet display common structural underpinnings. We suggest that the
similarities and differences in the cases of Germany, the United States, the United Kingdom, Italy, Chile, Spain, Ireland, Portugal, Turkey, Poland, Sweden, and Denmark provide a basis for a variegated financialisation approach to social geographic issues raised by the financialisation of housing (Fields and Uffer 2016; Aalbers 2007, Aalbers 2016; Lopez-Morales 2011; Norris and Byrne 2014; Robertson 2014a; Robertson 2014b; Santos, Serra, and Teles 2015; Topal et al. 2015; Lis 2015; Lund-Hansen et al. 2015).
6 Financialisation of housing and sustainability

We truly cannot afford the rich and the systems that support them. They are living beyond our means and those of the planet, and their interests are at odds with those of the 99% and the environment. We must stop supporting them. (Sayer 2015, p. 366)

Research into relations between financialisation and sustainability is growing, and includes reports in this FESSUD series available at http://fessud.eu/working-papers/ (for overviews see Gabbi and Ticci 2014 and Vercelli 2014b). But there remains relatively little research focused more specifically on financialisation of housing in relation to sustainability issues (Lund Hansen et al 2015). While the three ‘pillars’ of sustainability – environmental, social and economic – are commonly appealed to, most sustainability research as well as public discourse is on environmental dimensions, while economic sustainability tends to translate into survival of firms and business as usual, and social sustainability remains little more than a buzzword in the context of ‘corporate social responsibility’. As Vallance et al. (2011, p. 342) argue, social sustainability ‘is a concept in chaos’. Not surprisingly, this pattern is reflected also in research on financialisation of housing.

Regarding relations between financialisation of housing and environmental sustainability, there is interesting research into how innovative financing models for promoting energy efficiency and reduction in carbon emissions can contribute to low carbon transitions deemed necessary for environmental sustainability (Gouldson et al. 2015). This resonates with Fainstein’s progressive optimism that some forms of ‘financialisation could prove advantageous’ (2016, p. 1507). Clearly, finance has an important role to play in sustainable development, even if critical research suggests its current role in the financialisation of nature runs counter to sustainable development (Clark and Hermele 2014).
From our perspective on financialisation as inherently exchange-value oriented, it is questionable if these innovative models can be properly considered part of a financialisation process, given their clear use-value orientation. Not all activities of financial actors can be subsumed under the concept of financialisation. Sustainability may well necessitate the effective containment of financialisation, understood as the expansion of activities of ‘takers’ at the cost of ‘makers’ (Foroohar 2016), but such containment does not necessitate the end of financial activities required for social economic integration.

In pace with the expansion of sustainability as discursive value-enhancing symbol, it tends to become an ‘empty signifier’. The financial bubble has its related counterpart in the bubble of ‘green cities’ and ‘green’ flagship redevelopments based on greenwashing as key element of property- and city-branding. The ‘sustainability-enhanced investment products’ Sullivan (2013) studies in the financialisation of nature have their equivalents in built environments, where urban redevelopment schemes labelled ‘green’ by investors, landed developer interests, city planners and politicians have come to be called ‘eco-gentrification’ by critical analysts and those displaced in the process (Quastel 2009; Bryson 2013). Checker (2011) shows how sustainability rhetoric is used to justify rapid increases in costs of housing and reduce the risk of social resistance to the displacement of low-income residents. Environmental gentrification, says Checker (2011, p. 212) ‘operates through a discourse of sustainability which simultaneously describes a vision of ecologically and socially responsible urban planning, a ‘green’ lifestyle which appeals to affluent, eco-conscious residents, and a technocratic, politically neutral approach to solving environmental problems’.

As information strategy in public relations, greenwashing is often used to persuade consumers to sustain their consumption habits by providing misleading information about environmental impacts of commodities, thereby deflecting potential social action (Munshi and Kurian 2005; Ramus and Montiel 2005). Such an approach to sustainability is not only business friendly but also tends to integrate local governments as facilitators of ‘green’ financialized housing (Marvin and Guy 1997).
In the cross-border Öresund region surrounding Copenhagen and Malmö, eco-branding strategies have been successfully employed in the wake of de-industrialization. Market-based entrepreneurial urban planning has systematically utilized greenwashing to boost property values and attract both capital investments and a more ‘economically sustainable’ population with little or no concern for the sustainability of material flows of natural resources associated with the lifestyles and consumption patterns of this ‘creative class’ (Anderberg and Clark 2013).

In a study of large development projects in Zurich, Theurillat and Crevoisier (2013; 2014) show how sustainability can be utilized by powerful financial interests in negotiating processes of securitisation and financialisation, as well as by local authorities to guide urban development. A related study in France shows how ‘the territorial dimension of refurbishment economics may reproduce the uneven geography of financialized commercial real estate that preceded the implementation of sustainable development related legislation’ (Attuyer et al. 2012, p. 15).

In the field of green political economy one can distinguish between pro-growth perspectives and no-growth perspectives (Khan and Clark 2016). While the pro-growth perspective proposes ‘a reconfiguration of the current global economy’, meeting sustainability challenges by making market forces compatible with ecological concerns, the no-growth perspective ‘implies a total transformation of the global economic system’ (Urhammer and Røpke 2013, p. 62).

From the pro-growth perspective, the main challenge for green transitioning is redirecting financial flows towards green investment. It is assumed that absolute decoupling between environmental impact and economic growth can be achieved through investment in green innovation and technology and by regulating polluting technologies and changes in environmental behaviour. The economy can continue to function much as it does today, as policies for meeting sustainability challenges make market forces compatible with ecological concerns.

No-growth perspectives rather see the current financial system as a root cause of environmental problems, building as it does on the norm of endless compound growth.
Debt-fuelled economic growth driven by a financial sector swelling well beyond the productive capacities of the ‘real economy’ is seen to underpin unsustainable resource extraction and exploitation of what ecological economists call the ‘real-real economy’ – flows of energy and materials (Kallis et al. 2009; Martinez Alier 2009). Policies proposed from the no-growth perspective include regulating finance (e.g. state monopoly on money creation, taxes on financial transactions, barriers to tax evasion through tax havens), and designing a financial system conducive to a steady-state or no-growth economy in the long run. With regard to housing, this would involve legal and institutional reform to secure public or communal use-value oriented investments in housing that is not only environmentally sustainable but also socially sustainable.

Housing is a basic human need and human right. The track record of financialised housing sectors in providing for this need is consistent: those with abundant income and wealth expand their already high housing consumption, while those excluded from adequate housing (or from housing altogether) become more numerous. If social sustainability is to have any meaning at all, we must ask if it is sustainable to create legal and institutional conditions for the continued expansion of financialisation in the sphere of housing.

It is helpful to be reminded of Polanyi’s (2001) three basic mechanisms of social economic integration: community reciprocity, state redistribution and market exchange (cf. Clark and Johansson 2016). Financialised housing is associated not only with the expansion of market exchange as basis for integration at the expense of the other mechanisms. It is important to fully recognize the active involvement of the state in creating the conditions for financialised systems of housing provision. Only in this way can we understand that state redistribution channelling resources into the rapidly increasing wealth of a resurgent rentier class dwarfs the small trickles of tax-based transfers to poor households in need of housing. Addressing the sustainability issues surrounding financialisation of built environments will require that the state create very different conditions. In so doing, it would come a good ways toward making rent gap theory less self-evidently true (Clark 2014; Clark 2016).
7 Conclusion

[F]unnelling land-related capital flows [associated with financialisation of housing] goes hand in hand with signing off significant parts of future labour, decisionmaking capacity and well-being to mortgage debt repayments. (García-Lamarca and Kaika 2016, p. 313)

It is imperative that we begin to think through the political strategies required to confront the excesses of capital in the here and now and find openings for the construction of viable political economic alternatives. (Harvey 2016, p. 322)

Empirical studies of cities across Europe suggest that financialisation of built environments can be conceptualised as a generic process encompassing many variegated sets of institutional arrangements and social relations. The contingencies surrounding and forming the process give rise to different political, social and environmental impacts which do not fit easily into the categories of ideal types, and yet cannot be adequately understood as unconnected to related processes extending across geopolitical scales.

The political impacts of financialisation of housing are enmeshed with variegated neoliberalisation, manifesting in the multifarious transformations associated with entrepreneurial urban governance. Cities are commodified, branded, and strapped to the dictates of inter-urban competition: attract capital and the creative class, or suffer the consequences. Urban politics is furthermore impacted by growing inequalities associated with financialisation, as consolidations of economic power infiltrate processes of democratic decision making.

The social geographic impacts of financialisation of housing – social polarisation with growing homelessness, slum formation and ‘urban decay’ at one end and absentee ownership of extravagant housing at the other end – are intertwined with the political impacts, which reinforce financialisation of housing as part and parcel of
entrepreneurial urban governance. Housing is increasingly considered a pure financial asset, and decisions over housing production and distribution are made in terms of its exchange value rather than its use value. Decisions to ‘invest’ in housing become investor-oriented, geared to secure increasing exchange values for rentiers, rather than object-oriented, geared to the use values and basic needs of people associated with social reproduction.

The impacts of financialisation of housing on urban sustainability are the least researched and most difficult to pin down, not least due to the elusiveness and co-opted character of sustainability. Financing investments in ‘green’ and ‘sustainable’ built environments is an important element of the larger sphere of environmental politics. But so far it seems that financial actors have engaged more in marketing the market-solution to environmental problems in order to expand spheres of speculative investment opportunities, and in facilitating greenwashing in order to ‘sustainability-enhance’ investment vehicles and their underlying real estate values, than in any serious engagement with the nitty-gritty of environmental degradation or the complex issues surrounding social sustainability.

Given the co-evolutionary character of these processes, politics geared to address problems in one will have impacts on the others. Drawing on the analyses above we conclude that financialisation of housing has had severely adverse impacts on democracy, social cohesion and sustainability. Policies for containing financialisation of housing need to include measures to de-commodify housing and urban space more generally, institutionalise floors and ceilings on income and wealth, deepen democracy and use-value-oriented decision-making, and replace market-fundamentalist ideology with egalitarian ideas that recognise our interdependence, how we mutually constitute one another, how we are dependent upon and owe solidarity to others. Consequently, the same politics and institutions that can bring finance to better serve economic, social and environmental needs, will also make rent gap theory not true (Clark 2016).
References


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**THE ABSTRACT OF THE PROJECT IS:**

The research programme will integrate diverse levels, methods and disciplinary traditions with the aim of developing a comprehensive policy agenda for changing the role of the financial system to help achieve a future which is sustainable in environmental, social and economic terms. The programme involves an integrated and balanced consortium involving partners from 14 countries that has unsurpassed experience of deploying diverse perspectives both within economics and across disciplines inclusive of economics. The programme is distinctively pluralistic, and aims to forge alliances across the social sciences, so as to understand how finance can better serve economic, social and environmental needs. The central issues addressed are the ways in which the growth and performance of economies in the last 30 years have been dependent on the characteristics of the processes of financialisation; how has financialisation impacted on the achievement of specific economic, social, and environmental objectives?; the nature of the relationship between financialisation and the sustainability of the financial system, economic development and the environment?; the lessons to be drawn from the crisis about the nature and impacts of financialisation?; what are the requisites of a financial system able to support a process of sustainable development, broadly conceived?'
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